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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of current strategies in the fight to end 
gender-based violence in India, specifically focusing on the practice of gender mainstreaming 
in response to gender-based violence in the country. In order to conduct this analysis, I have 
used Carol Lee Bacchi’s proposed “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” method of policy 
analysis as a guiding framework to run throughout my research. 
My research began by looking into the “problem” of gender-based violence in India as 
represented within gender mainstreaming policies, and how this problematisation is shaped by 
contributing assumptions, environmental circumstances, and other guiding factors in its 
formation. I then move on to consider how this representation contributes to lived societal 
effects, in particular how the underlying assumption that gender exists within fixed essentialist 
binary categories that necessarily depict women as the only victims and men as the only 
perpetrators of gender-based violence conflicts with gender mainstreaming’s ultimate goal of 
achieving gender equality, and assessing how this assumption excludes the rights of those who 
do not identify within the gender binary (including many of India’s transgender communities) 
from gender equality goals. I argue that building the problem representation based on this 
binary assumption fails to achieve the definition of gender mainstreaming’s mission in that it 
works to perpetuate certain forms of inequality, and reinforces damaging gender roles and 
stereotypes that are counter-productive in their use by reinforcing and rigidly interpellating 
rigidly enforced gender norms and expectations. I apply a combination of theories, such as 
Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity, Posner and Rasmusen’s theories on norm adoption 
and social enforcement, and West and Zimmerman’s theory of “doing gender” in order to argue 
that gender mainstreaming’s understanding of gender as existing within the binary reinforces 
gender hierarchies that place masculinity in the hegemonic position, and femininity in the 
subordinate as a social norm, in a way that is adopted and “done” by individuals. I propose that 
the reinforcement of these norms ensures that gender mainstreaming policies are actually 
paradoxically and unconsciously complicit in the very structures that they are working to 
dismantle. 
I conclude by proposing that gender mainstreaming policies would be greatly benefitted 
and work more efficiently towards their goals if they were adapted by dismantling the 
underlying binary understanding of gender that they are formed upon. I put forward that the 
 
 
goals of gender mainstreaming policies should be broadened to become more intersectional, 
and to include individuals of all identities in the fight to end gender inequality. To do so would 
not only benefit those from frequently marginalised communities who are routinely subjected 
to gender-based violence, such as the long-existing Hijra community, but would also benefit 
society more widely by breaking down a damaging and restrictive dichotomy that reinforces a 
harmful gender hierarchy. 
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On 16th December 2012, the brutal gang rape of female student Jyoti Singh took place on a 
public bus in New Delhi. The girl was travelling home from the cinema with a male friend 
when she was attacked by five men riding the bus who took turns in assaulting her, inserted a 
metal rod into her so forcefully that her internal organs were irreparably damaged, and threw 
her and her friend from the moving bus, leaving them for dead. She died in hospital thirteen 
days later as a result of her injuries (Boland, 2015). 
 International furore rose almost immediately following the attack, making headlines 
worldwide and resulting in activists taking to the streets of New Delhi to protest in the most 
public demonstration against the country’s intensely high rate of gender based violence India 
had ever seen (Walia, 2014). The media surrounding the case drew attention to much needed 
stricter protection and enforcement of protection laws, and so in 2013 new legislation was 
introduced that maintained stricter punishments for sex offenders and the death penalty for 
repeat offenders. The attack’s huge response triggered a number of positive effects, as it 
appeared to encourage more victims of assault to speak out, with statistics showing a fifteen 
percent increase in women reporting crimes committed against them from 2013 to 2014, and 
calls for greater care and justice resulted in the introduction of new fast-track courts and rape 
victim help. New guidelines were introduced in hospitals, banning the much criticised “two-
finger test” (a test in which a doctor would insert two or more fingers into a woman to check 
for a hymen and thus determine whether or not she had been raped), and insisting upon 
designated rooms at hospitals to medically and forensically examine victims with a female 
attendant always present (Ibid.). Newspapers worldwide honoured Jyoti, referring to her as 
“Nirbhaya” (meaning “fearless”) and sent Jyoti’s parents tributes in memory of her bravery, 
and in 2015 the BBC released a documentary about the attack, India’s Daughter, (Boland, 
2015). 
 Despite these apparent developments following the recent high-profile focus on gender-
based violence in India however, there have been multiple reports that many new policies are 
not routinely enforced, and India still remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world 
in which to be a woman. For example, there have been reports that the “two-finger test” is still 
being taught to trainee doctors and statistics demonstrate that public transport is still no safer, 
with numbers showing that New Delhi’s public transport ranked second worst in a transport 
systems survey with regards to safety at night and being subjected to verbal harassment (Walia, 
2014). Following the reported rape of a girl in an Uber taxi in December 2014, Jyoti’s parents 
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spoke publicly, with Jyoti’s father Badri Singh declaring that despite the media attention and 
politician’s proposed intentions, “Nothing has changed… All promises and statements made 
by our leaders and ministers have turned out to be shallow,” (Ibid.). 
 The attack on Jyoti also received significant negative press and criticism, and social 
judgements on Jyoti’s actions the night of her attack have been widely cast and reported upon. 
India’s Daughter showed Jyoti’s own attackers blaming her for their attack. Mukesh Singh, 
one of the convicted attackers, stated that Jyoti was in the wrong for fighting back as, “She 
should just be silent and allow the rape,” (Boland, 2015). High-profile members of Indian 
society also criticised the event, with one of the defence lawyers serving in the prosecution of 
her attackers, AP Singh, quoted condoning the actions of Jyoti’s attackers, stating, “If my 
daughter or sister engaged in pre-marital activities and disgraced herself and allowed herself to 
lose face and character by doing such things, I would most certainly take … [her] to my 
farmhouse and, in front of my entire family, I would put petrol on her and set her alight.” 
(Ibid.). 
 While these sentiments may appear repulsive and extreme to many following the 
aftermath in the media, and are certainly framed to be shocking by the documentary, in actuality 
they are fairly representative of many commonly held views existing throughout Indian society. 
An International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) survey carried out in 2013 that polled 
over 12,000 people across India reported around forty percent of men polled held “rigid and 
discriminatory gender views”, that demonstrated their support for the belief that women are 
not equal to men and that they strongly supported actions to control women (Weiss, 2013). The 
study revealed that the men holding these “rigid and discriminatory” views were also four times 
more likely to prefer male children over female, and three times more likely to engage in 
physically assaulting their intimate partners (Ibid.). These attitudes support and are 
representative of statistics detailing that there are 940 women for every 1000 men, 914 female 
children for every 1000 male children, and around thirty million “extra men” between the ages 
of fifteen and thirty five, due to the high bias in favour of son preference that leads to female 
infanticide and sex-selective abortions (Timmons and Trivedi, 2013). Further to this, whilst 
international figures demonstrate that one in four women worldwide have experienced 
domestic violence at some point in their lives, the ICRW survey reported that fifty two percent 
of women polled in India had experienced some form of violence throughout their life, and 
sixty percent of men polled admitted committing an act of violence against an intimate partner 
at some point in their life (Priya et al., 2014). These discriminatory attitudes are reflected 
throughout women’s interactions and existing within India society, as there are a multiplicity 
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of side effects caused as a result, such as lack of adequate healthcare and protection for women 
throughout the whole of India that, for example, result in numbers showing that India has the 
highest HIV rate amongst transgender women in the world, with almost forty four percent of 
Indian transgender women infected with the virus (Baral et al., 2013). 
 Much of the activism and responses to gender-based violence and gender inequality 
more generally in India have attracted criticism due to much of their focus being specifically 
addressed to women. For example, in the Country Information: India: Women Fearing Gender-
Based Harm/Violence guide created by the UK Home Office, all guidance and information is 
specifically directed at informing women of their rights, seeking help after an assault, safe 
places they may go or help in relocating to a safer area, without acknowledging anything men 
could contribute to helping end gender-based violence and keep women safe, therefore 
indirectly holding women responsible for their own safety (2015). Although attitudes such as 
this undoubtedly do help women protect themselves, it again places the responsibility of 
keeping safe from violence solely on potential victims, rather than calling out perpetrators of 
violence and governing bodies. As a response to these women-centred reactions to gender-
based violence, there have been multiple calls to bring the nature of structural inequality more 
into the mainstream. As Manasi Sinha states, “initiatives specifically addressed to women, 
which often operate at the society, although needed, are insufficient on their own to bring 
change. While these initiatives are innovative and benefit women, they do (...) little to reduce 
or end inequalities between women and men,” (No Date, p. 13). Instead, Sinha puts forward 
the merits of a strategy for gender equality known as gender mainstreaming, which, 
“recognizes interlink [sic] between women’s relative disadvantages and men’s relative 
advantage and therefore focuses on the social differences between women and men: differences 
that are learned, changeable over time and vary within and between cultures,” (Ibid.). 
 
What is gender mainstreaming? 
At the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action from the Fourth United Nations World Conference on 
Women in Beijing, gender mainstreaming was adopted as a key strategy in the fight for gender 
equality (Angela King in the UN Gender Mainstreaming Overview, 2002, p. v). Gender 
mainstreaming strategies aim to confront core, structural gender inequalities by analysing the 
different, “needs, priorities, roles and experiences of women and men as well as the integration 
of specific actions to address any gender-based inequalities that may have emerged from this 
analysis,” (UNIDO, 2014, p. 4). Mainstreaming gender perspectives aims to ensure that issues 
regarding gender inequality are at the forefront of all policy-making decisions, analyses, 
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projects, and institutional processes. The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) agreed definition of gender mainstreaming is: 
…the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy 
for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of 
the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all 
political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and 
inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality. (King for 
the UN, 2002, pp. v - vi) 
Gender mainstreaming is now viewed to be so effectively essential that it is often 
considered to be a necessary component in all policy-making processes, project designs and 
implementations, and development work in order to work towards ending gender inequality on 
both individual bases and on a global scale. It looks to current situations and differences 
between the roles, expectations, needs, considerations, and voices of both men and women in 
order to lessen gaps between the sexes in a way that holds society at all levels accountable and 
responsible for the existence of gender inequality and the fight to end it. In societies that 
systematically privilege men and masculinity over women and femininity, it is necessary to 
approach processes with a gender perspective, in order to counteract initially supposed gender-
neutral strategies that could actually end up unintentionally privileging men’s needs. Strategies, 
tools, and guides proposed by the United Nations (UN) and implemented by governments, 
nongovernmental organisations, and influential decision makers therefore are becoming 
increasingly promoted, adopted, and adapted, and viewed to be a crucial component in 
systematically altering society to end gender inequality forever. 
 
Problem Formulation 
Due to the credibility given to the adoption of gender mainstreaming policies, this thesis aims 
to look into the effects of gender mainstreaming on the problem of gender-based violence in 
India, and how effective current guidelines and strategies are, and have previously been, at 
contributing to lessening gender-based violence in India, as well as the struggle to eradicate it 
entirely. I am especially interested in looking into the effects gender mainstreaming has had on 
representation of gender and gender identity, and how these effects have translated to affecting 
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the lives of individuals of all gender identities in India. It is my intention therefore to analyse 
the gender mainstreaming strategies, tools, techniques, and practices devised, encouraged, and 
implemented by the UN, governing bodies, scholars, and nongovernmental organisations in 
order to assess how necessary, effective, and thorough they are in relation to the case of gender 
inequality in India, and to investigate how efficient these strategies and practices are in 
achieving the gender mainstreaming’s ultimate goals not to perpetuate inequality, and 
ultimately achieve gender inequality (King for the UN, 2002, p. vi). Therefore, my main 
problem formulation is: 
How effective are gender mainstreaming policies in working towards ending gender-based 






The overall research, theorising, analysis, and writing of this paper has taken place over a five 
month period, from March 2016 to July 2016. It takes an inductive approach that relies on five 
research questions in order to analyse India’s situational context in relation to gender 
mainstreaming from a different perspective and form a conclusion based on my analysis. 
Throughout the course of this paper, I hope to first analyse current gender mainstreaming 
guidelines and strategies that aim to work for victims of gender-based violence and against 
gender inequality in India, before applying gender and gender norm theories in order to 
examine the effectiveness of current methods of gender mainstreaming that are targeted at 
dealing with gender-based violence, and the effects gender mainstreaming has on gender 
representations.  
Throughout the course of this research I have relied largely on secondary sources to 
help reach my conclusion. The sources I have referenced are a combination of both quantitative 
data such as statistics and direct polls and interviews with community members, and qualitative 
research such as theory building and policy analysis that I have applied alongside each other in 
order to gain further insight and greater understanding of the context of gender inequality and 
gender-based violence in India today. I have used such sources to guide my research with 
certain theories and methods of analysis, reports and guidelines in order to examine current 
gender mainstreaming policies in the Indian context, numerical data and statistics to give 
specific concrete understanding of the problem of gender based violence in India, and theories 
of gender and norm creation to apply to these contexts. I made the decision to rely on secondary 
data so heavily as I wished to reach a theoretical and suggestive hypothesis based on current 
policies and strategies used to deal with gender inequality and gender based violence in India 
that is formed out of an analysis of current methods, and so it was necessary to examine those 
methods via secondary data analysis. However, as argued by Bryman, relying on secondary 
data does not necessarily impede research, but merely allows the researcher more time to spend 
on researching and analysing the proposed problem and collected data (2014). 
In order to conduct this research, I have used Carol Lee Bacchi’s ‘What’s the Problem 
Represented to be?’ approach to policy analysis as a guiding framework in conducting my 
research. Bacchi proposes five questions to use as guiding factors when conducting one’s own 
analysis of certain policies, and I have applied these to current gender mainstreaming 
guidelines and policies in order to complete my research. I use Bacchi’s five questions to header 
five separate chapters that initially focus on analysing the current problem represented within 
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gender mainstreaming policies and how and why it is shaped as it is, then progress to examining 
the lived effects such a representation has on current communities and contexts in India, before 
moving on to considerations of how the problem could be represented differently in order to 
suggest amendments to current gender mainstreaming policies. 
 
Bacchi: ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ 
Bacchi’s approach to policy analysis was developed to challenge what she argues are “reactive” 
understandings of policy decision-making processes that assume that policies are formed as a 
reaction to identifiable social problems in order to form an effective response to “solve” them 
(2007, p. 1). The problem with such an approach, for Bacchi, is that supposedly “reactive” 
responses to social problems appear to be neutral, but in actuality all policies are formed based 
on interpretations of what decision makers view the “problem” to be, which often has causal 
effects according to such an interpretation and agenda. In comparison, her approach aims to 
challenge the view that policy makers give particular “shape” to social problems in their 
perception, language surrounding them, and proposals for policies made in order to address 
them. This approach especially considers the language and discourse surrounding supposed 
social problems, and how they influence the formation of certain problems into specifically 
constructed “problematisations”. These so called problematisations are taken into so much 
consideration via this approach because they impose particular interpretations upon the 
suggested social problem that are not so much neutrally reactive, but in fact actually create 
certain impressions of what the problem actually is. These impressions made by the shaping 
and formation of certain problems have verifiable significant lived effects upon those 
surrounding the supposed problem, whether they are considered to be causes or victims of such 
problems. This method of analysis aims to identify the ways in which problematisations are 
shaped by policy-makers’ representation of them, and the knowledge assumed throughout this 
process (2010, p. 2).  
In order to guide on how to conduct this form of analysis, Bacchi has devised five 
questions to apply to certain policies in order to guide understanding into the problem 
represented within a certain policy, how this representation affects the lives of those under its 
jurisdiction, and how different representations of the problem could result in different effects 




1. What is the problem (of ‘problem gamblers/gambling’, ‘drug use/abuse’, domestic 
violence, pay equity, health inequalities, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy or 
policy proposal? 
 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem? 
Identify binaries, key concepts and categories.  
 
3. What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? Consider the 
following kinds of effects: how subjects are constituted within this representation, the 
limits imposed on what can be said and lived effects.  
 
4. What is left unproblematic in this representation of the problem? Where are the 
silences? How would ‘responses’ differ if the ‘problem’ were thought about or 
represented differently? [Here it is useful to think about shifts in representation of the 
'problem’ over time and/or across cultures.]  
 
5. How/where are dominant problem representations produced, disseminated and 
defended? How could they be contested/disrupted? Explore contradictions and 




What is the problem represented to be in a specific policy or 
policy proposal? 
 
Gender mainstreaming strategies that have been designed, implemented, and carried out in 
India aim specifically to combat the problem of gender inequality within the country. They are 
designed to target the twelve critical areas of concern determined by the 1995 Beijing Platform 
for Action that need particular focus when addressing gender inequality in order to most 
efficiently work towards gender equality and equity. These are: women and poverty, education 
and training of women, women and health, violence against women, women in disaster 
management, women and the economy, women in power and decision making, institutional 
mechanisms for the advancement of women, human rights of women, women and the media, 
women and the environment, and the girl child (UNDP, 2008, p. 2). Gender mainstreaming 
strategies represent the high prevalence of gender inequality and its lived effects, especially 
within these twelve arenas, to be a problem which is in dire need of being addressed. As the 
ECOSOC definition states, achieving gender equality is the “ultimate goal” of gender 
mainstreaming (UN overview, 2002, p. vi). However, the “problem” as represented by gender 
mainstreaming divisions, strategies, and practices is not merely the existence of gender 
inequality in and of itself, but the way in which it is so deeply entrenched within a multiplicity 
of arenas, such as decision making and development processes. As the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) guide to implementation of gender mainstreaming 
strategies states, gender mainstreaming aims to ensure that, “a concern for gender equality is 
brought into the ‘mainstream’ of activities rather than dealt with as an ‘add-on’,” (UNIDO, 
2014, p.2). To bring a gender perspective into the mainstream challenges deep-seated and 
innately accepted gender inequality, with the aim of restructuring the ways in which gender is 
thought about, and emphasise when it is not thought about, in order to highlight differences 
and encourage productive discourse regarding how men and women are affected and treated as 
a result of different activities. As the UN overview to gender mainstreaming states, “Achieving 
greater equality between women and men will require changes at many levels, including 
changes in attitudes and relationships, changes in institutions and legal frameworks, changes 
in economic institutions, and changes in political decision-making structures,” (2002, p. 1). 
Strategies in gender mainstreaming aim to work by introducing a gender perspective into 
multiple discussions in such a way that determines the gendered effects of decision making 
processes are necessarily considered at every level. This is a crucial aspect to consider in order 
to reconstruct supposedly gender neutral events that hide gendered effects and differences. 
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 It is clear to see where this problem representation prevails in India. Men hold 
extremely privileged positions over women that simultaneously advantage them and 
disadvantage women in a multitude of forms. In India female infanticide, sex-selective 
abortion, and repeated forced pregnancies are common occurrences as a result of son 
preference over daughters, leaving the country with a disproportionately low ratio of females 
to males, with the ratio predicted to be as low as 793 women for every 1000 men in some 
regions (Gupta & Sharma, 2002, p. 115). Selective schooling and educational opportunities has 
ensured that only fifty four percent of women in India, compared to seventy six percent of men, 
are literate (FSD Foundation, No Date), and gender-based and sexual violence is rife, with 
figures showing that a woman is raped every twenty minutes, and experts predicting that the 
actual amount of rapes committed is likely to be much higher (Ignatius, 2013, pp. 2 - 7). 
Women are routinely harmed over dowry disputes, with a study of dowry victims showing that 
a quarter of victims were murdered or driven to suicide, and sixty one percent of victims were 
thrown out of their husband’s home after extended periods of harassment and torture (Gupta & 
Sharma, 2004, p. 115). Contributing factors to gender based violence are visible at all levels; 
despite multiple legal protections for victims of gender-based violence, many are not fully 
implemented or respected in a number of cases, and trust in the justice system is resultantly 
low. Although recent years have seen an increase in policies aimed to protect victims of gender-
based violence, these laws are often not implemented and so necessary protection is often not 
provided. For example, although child marriages are criminalised, Unicef reported that forty 
seven percent of girls were married before they turned eighteen (Dhillon, 2015), and certain 
acts of violence are still legal, such as the rape of one’s spouse. Police corruption is also a huge 
problem for victims of gender-based violence in India; police officers often rely on political 
connections, strategically-formed allegiances, and bribes to get by due to their low wages, and 
as a result of deeply embedded cultural understandings of women’s purity, modesty, and shame 
it is not uncommon for police officers to focus on reconciliation between the victim and their 
attacker/s than justice for the attack (Harris, 2013). As Varshney states, “A woman’s body as 
the site of cultural purity is the predominant theme in the epics (...) And dishonoring a woman 
is equal to dishonoring a family and even a culture,” (quoted in Harris, 2013). This attitude is 
so widely accepted and adopted that officers often feel that it is more their duty and obligation 
to protect the modesty of the victim rather than secure her justice, and there are multiple reports 
of officers encouraging victims to marry their attackers in order to escape the societally-
imposed shame upon themselves and their families. Further to this, there are a distinct lack of 
available officers to actually respond to and follow up with victims’ needs and reports of 
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violence, with statistics showing that there are only 1,585,117 police officers in India. With 
India’s total population being over 1.2 billion, this equals to around 130 officers per 100,000 
people (Ibid.). The lack of trust for justice through the legal system is reflected in estimates 
that show that for every hundred rape cases in India only ten are reported, and for every hundred 
reported rape cases only five offenders are actually convicted (Gupta & Sharma, 2004, p. 116). 
 In their 2004 research project into gender-based violence in India, Gupta & Sharma 
summed up how gender based violence inherently exists at every level within society, stating 
that, 
The phenomenon of violence against women arises from patriarchal notions of ownership 
over women's bodies, sexuality, labor, reproductive rights, mobility and level of 
autonomy. Deep-rooted ideas about male superiority enable men to freely exercise 
unlimited power over women's lives and effectively legitimize it too. Violence is thus a 
tool that men use constantly to control women as a result of highly internalized 
patriarchal conditioning coupled with legitimacy for coercion to enforce compliance and 
increasing aspirations, frustrations and 'might is right' becoming a legitimate view and 
increasing need for assertion of individual egos and control. Within this context, several 
developments serve as a backdrop to the discussion and analysis of increased violence 
against women. (Ibid.) 
 Gender mainstreaming attempts in India in this context are therefore designed to help 
combat the huge problem of gender inequality and the high rates of gender-based violence by 
bringing attention to the structural realities that allow it to prevail. By bringing gender into 
mainstream discourse, prevailing inequalities are more likely to be considered at levels where 
they otherwise wouldn’t necessarily be. Gender mainstreaming’s interpretation of gender-
based violence in India is shaped by the understanding that such violence is permitted to exist, 





What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation 
of the problem?  
 
Identify binaries, key concepts and categories. 
 
The initial assumption underlying the problem representation within gender mainstreaming is 
that the existence of gender inequality and high rates of gender-based violence in India is a 
necessarily bad thing, and that definitive measures need to be taken during each and every step 
of decision making and development processes to bring gender differences into the mainstream 
in order to eradicate it. Although the interpretation shaping this assumption may seem to be 
somewhat of a given, it actually conflicts with a number of fairly commonly held views 
throughout Indian society. As the ICRW study conducted in 2013 showed, forty percent of men 
polled displayed “rigid and discriminatory views” towards gender equality. However, perhaps 
surprisingly, the study also showed that women often held similarly rigid views with regards 
to gender roles, expectations, masculinity, and violence. Twenty eight percent of women and 
twenty five percent of men polled agreed that, “when a woman is raped, she is usually to blame 
for putting herself in that situation,” sixty five percent of both women and men agreed that, 
“There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten,” and fifty one percent of men and fifty 
seven percent of women agreed that, “A woman should tolerate domestic violence in order to 
keep her family together,” (Priya et al., 2014, pp. 27 - 28).The study determined that, “social 
expectations are translated into internalized values for women,” (Ibid., p. 27), and this 
acceptance, internalisation, and normalisation of deeply-entrenched inequality in India has 
been quantifiably demonstrated with Geert Hofstede’s model to quantify different nations’ 
tolerance of hierarchies and inequality. The model, known as “power distance”, calculates, “the 
extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country 
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally,” and shows that India scores highly on 
this scale, signifying Indian society’s “appreciation for hierarchy” that leaves individuals 
dependent on those who hold power for purpose and direction and especially accepting of these 
un-equal structures and rights between those in positions of power and those “lesser down in 
the pecking order.” Hofstede identifies that “control is familiar” in India that is so ingrained, 
accepted, and uncontested that it even provides a “psychological security” (Hofstede 2015). 
Studies such as this demonstrate the potential problems and conflict that could arise with 
assumptions such as gender inequality and gender-based violence necessarily being a bad thing, 
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as the presupposition that gender inequality and occurrences of gender-based violence 
necessarily need to be eradicated shapes a new understanding that contrasts with and challenges 
the status quo in many regions throughout India.  
There are also a number of relevant assumptions regarding gender that underlie many 
gender mainstreaming strategies, both in theory and in practice. Many representations of 
gender mainstreaming, including those devised, perpetuated, and implemented by the UN, 
demonstrate an underlying binaristic understanding of gender, and gender inequality, working 
with the assumption that there are only two, opposite, gender categories. The gender binary is 
a mode of dichotomous mainstream thinking, especially throughout Western culture, that 
classifies all people into one of two genders, man or woman, and does not give much allowance 
for deviation from the two categories. Throughout a number of documents created and used by 
the UN in order to guide and assist with gender mainstreaming projects, such as the UN’s 
detailed Gender Mainstreaming in Practice Handbook (2005) and Gender Mainstreaming 
Overview compiled by the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement 
of Women (2002), there are plenty of referrals to ‘both’ genders, women and men, with no 
outright recognition of the possibility of any deviation from either of the two categories. This 
can be seen throughout both documents and is symptomatic of the ECOSOC definition of 
gender mainstreaming that aims to ensure that, “women and men benefit equally and inequality 
is not perpetuated” (Ibid, p. v). Language used when categorising the beneficiaries of certain 
policies is significant, as it clarifies exactly who is included and who is excluded from specific 
motions and therefore who is to benefit or who is to suffer as a result. Passages such as, “both 
women and men can influence, participate in and benefit from development processes,” (Ibid., 
p. vi) are inclusive in their determination to ensure that women are equally involved in decision 
making and development processes, but the use of the dual term “both” when referring to men 
and women is exclusive in that it implies not just two genders, but only two. This is especially 
problematic as because when gender is understood as a binary concept, gender identity is often 
innately connected with sex assigned at birth – the very act of assigning a gender to a child 
occurs after viewing a child’s genitals, and they are necessarily assigned either “boy” or “girl” 
in correlation with either male and female genitalia viewed between their legs (Gender 
Spectrum, 2016). This correlation is directly made within UN gender mainstreaming 
guidelines, such as within the Gender Mainstreaming Overview which states that, “There was 
increased understanding of the importance of seeking out male allies and in working with men 
to jointly redefine gender roles and relations,” (Ibid., p. 9). This suggests an explicit equation 
between sex category and gender identity, as it links being “male”, a supposed biological 
 15 
 
reality, and gender identity in being a “man”, which does not merely suggest that the two are 
inextricably linked, but by using the two terms interchangeably suggests that they mean 
essentially the same thing. 
The understanding that gender exists within a binary structure of gender also underlies 
gender mainstreaming projects in practice. For example, in 2008 the UNDP collected a number 
of case studies of “Good Practices in Gender Mainstreaming”, a compilation of gender 
mainstreaming examples in practice across India which demonstrate the pragmatic lived effects 
of gender mainstreaming within the country. The document lists a number of cases, such as the 
Dilaasa (meaning “empathetic reassurance” in Hindustani) partnership, a coalition between 
two Healthcare initiatives that was designed to provide better treatment and aftercare to victims 
of domestic violence. The project was praised for its accomplishments by the UNDP due to its 
successful implementation and the increased amount of women who were referred and received 
beneficial treatment that catered specifically to their personal needs and requirements after 
suffering domestic violence (UNDP, 2008, p. 14). However, the formation of Dilaasa’s 
representation of domestic violence centred around a rigidly binary understanding that framed, 
and therefore specifically catered itself to, only female victims of domestic violence who had 
been subjected to violence only by a male aggressor. Similarly, another project discussed in 
the UNDP report that was praised for its successful attempt at gender mainstreaming was the 
Parivartan project, a Delhi Police initiative that aimed to provide better protection for women 
against violence by challenging patriarchal ideas regarding violence against women both in the 
community and within the police force. The project was commended by the UNDP due to its 
success in changing mind-sets to become more sympathetic and sensitive towards female 
victims, both within the police system and within the local community (Ibid., p. 6). The 
Parivartan project was similar to the Dilaasa project in its framework and representation of 
gender as, whilst these two examples demonstrated successful attempts of gender 
mainstreaming in practice that aim to bring gender perspectives into mainstream discourse in 
such a way that benefitted women and contributed towards the goal to end gender inequality, 
by only identifying individuals pertaining to one of two genders, with Dilaasa in reference to 
male aggressors and female victims, and Parivartan in reference to male police officers and 
female victims, both projects acknowledge gender identity existing only within two rigidly 
defined categories. 
The understanding of gender existing within a binary clearly underlies the 
representation of the problems gender mainstreaming in India aims to work against, by solely 
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representing gender-based violence as a clearly divided act in which individuals can fit into 
one of the two proposed groups: male perpetrators vs. female victims.  
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What effects are produced by this representation of the 
problem?  
 
Consider the following kind of effects: how subjects are constituted within this 
representation, the limits that can be imposed on what can be said and lived effects. 
 
Gender mainstreaming’s representation of the problem of gender inequality in India aims to 
highlight inequalities in all aspects in order to most effectively and efficiently identify and 
combat them at all levels, which can be seen in practice in a number of cases. Take for example 
again the Dilaasa partnership, an initiative between the Public Health Department of the 
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) and the Centre for Enquiry into Health and 
Allied Themes (CEHAT) which was the first hospital-based crisis centre in India with specific 
designs to address the needs of women facing violence in their homes and from their families 
(Deosthali et al., 2005, p.1). The Dilaasa partnership arose following studies that showed that, 
whilst many women who had experience gender-based and domestic violence were treated for 
their physical injuries, this was the extent of their treatment and there was no aftercare or 
provision for the emotional trauma, or much consideration into root causes of their injuries 
(UNDP, 2008, p. 14). The Dilaasa partnership recognised the damaging nature of this 
treatment, as the UNDP state, “the attitude of neglect and apathy that [domestic violence] 
victims encounter leaves them feeling extremely vulnerable and often exacerbates the vicious 
cycle of violence that they face,” (Ibid.). They recognised the different needs of patients, called 
the health system out on their, “complete lack of gender sensitivity within the system,” (2005, 
p. 4) and thus formed in order to better equip hospitals with tools to deal with victims of 
domestic violence and to, “[represent] the mainstreaming of this issue into a larger public 
structure,” (Ibid., p. 6). The partnership established two main goals in dealing with the victims 
of gender-based and domestic violence: to, “(1) institutionalise domestic violence—and more 
broadly, violence against women—as a legitimate and critical public health concern within the 
government hospital system, and (2) build the capacity of hospital staff and systems to 
adequately, sensitively and appropriately respond to the health needs of the victims and 
survivors of domestic violence,” (2005, p.1). Their centres provided counselling aid to referred 
victims to help deal with their emotional trauma, legal aid such as the provision of legal access, 
and social support such as helping set victims up with temporary safe shelters, as well as 
adequately providing training for healthcare professionals to deal sensitively and appropriately 
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with victims of domestic violence. They were trained on how to take forensic evidence that 
could later be used in court, provide emotional support, and to recognise when to refer a patient 
to the Dilaasa clinics (UNDP, 2008, p. 14). The Dilaasa centre noticed a gradual increase over 
the years of its implementation, from 111 attending in 2001 to 340 in 2004, which indicated 
that, “the recognition of domestic violence as a health issue within the health system [was] 
taking place slowly,” (Deosthali et al., 2005, p. 35). The overall acceptance and growth of the 
Dilaasa initiative deemed it a success by the UNDP (2008, p. 14). 
The Dilaasa case demonstrates how gender mainstreaming strategies can play out 
effectively in practice, and shows the positive and promising effects of bringing gender 
perspectives into the mainstream agenda. Dilaasa acknowledged a gap in India’s healthcare 
system, identifying that the system of adopting a seemingly gender neutral approach ignored 
crucial gender differences that left victims of domestic violence without adequate treatment 
and aftercare. Their project aimed to challenge the supposed gender neutrality of treatment of 
victims of domestic violence and identified why a lack of gender perspective with regards to 
such issues was inadequate. As Michaela Raab states, “in organisations without any explicit 
focus on gender equality or gender justice, the levels of awareness for gender-based 
discrimination (and the need to end it) tend to be uneven,” (2013). By bringing gender 
differences into focus and training hospital staff to effectively identify and treat these 
differences, Dilaasa reconstructed the staff’s perception and treatment of patients in such a way 
that not only were aftercare treatments improved in order to provide much-needed emotional 
care, but that by recognising signs of abuse, violence could be stopped earlier on in the abuse 
cycle and preventative measures could be established in order to protect the victim from further 
violence (2005, p. 23). 
Dilaasa also recognised some of their own limitations and addressed criticism of the 
project, acknowledging that whilst their aftercare treatment programs were more developed, 
they lacked established preventative measures to stop abuse occurring before it happened, 
rather than dealing entirely with women who had already experienced varying levels of abuse. 
They recognised that the nature of their work was very new and still developing, and that there 
was still plenty of work to continue to be done, and so recommended further research and action 
into preventing occurrences of domestic violence in the first place. Dilaasa is just one example 
of how the problematisation represented within gender mainstreaming policies can both shape 
practical initiatives and directly contribute to, and benefit, the lives of individuals affected by 
gender-based violence whilst simultaneously working to destablise patriarchal structures that 
innately deprioritise women’s issues, rights, and needs. 
 19 
 
However, the problematisation as represented by gender mainstreaming policies 
circulates and interpellates ideals that contribute to a number of lived effects that negatively 
impact individuals, and could even be argued as working against gender equality goals. The 
framework of gender mainstreaming’s problem representation is shaped in such a way that 
assumes that gender exists within an essentialist binary. There is a case for suggesting that by 
equating gender with biologically assigned sex at birth the cause for gender inequality is 
furthered as the act of doing so perpetuates norms and stereotypes that construct gender roles 
that are difficult to break apart. As Judith Butler states, the “distinction between sex and gender 
has been crucial to the long-standing feminist effort to debunk the claim that anatomy is 
destiny; sex is understood to be the invariant, anatomically distinct, and factic aspects of the 
female body, whereas gender is the cultural meaning and form that the body acquires,” (1986, 
p. 35). By equating sex and gender as inevitably linked (and therefore that sex necessarily 
determines gender) such as in the underlying of this problematisation, the argument that gender 
roles and expectations are a result of biology rather than social construction and imposition 
gains more traction. Whilst classifying people into two gender groups in this way can be a 
simplistic and helpful mode of categorisation for those working towards ending gender 
inequality as it easily identifies the largest focus group whose rights, social status, and 
representation need to be raised and centred upon in order to match the more privileged group, 
this representation can also be problematic in a number of ways. Attaching gender identity to 
biological understandings of sex often suggests that gender expression, presentation, and 
identity is as essential, inherent, and “natural” as biological makeup. This creates and 
normalises ideas of how men and women should, and do, behave, contributing to structured 
gender roles and forming the groundwork for the differential gendered socialisation of male 
and female children. As Andrew Gilden states,  
Gender’s regulatory effectiveness in our culture largely stems from biologically 
essentialist understandings of the production of gender identity. By creating the 
appearance that gender identity is rooted in biology, biological essentialism casts the 
primary means of gender perpetuation, the category of “sex,” as outside the realm of 
social construction as an aspect of one’s pre-social self. If situated as prior to being, “sex” 
cannot be deconstructed and reformulated as more inclusive of human diversity because 
it appears as if it has never been constructed at all. (2008, pp. 88-89).  
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What this means is that binary representations of gender within gender equality policies 
could be considered to be somewhat paradoxical. Whilst gender mainstreaming aims to 
deconstruct patriarchally assigned hierarchical gender roles, referring to gender in such rigidly 
defined categories somewhat restricts the potential of the goals that mainstreaming gender 
perspectives aims to achieve. In their essay arguing for a non-binary approach to feminism, 
Meg-John Barker states that,  
it seems to me that (most) feminism is about challenging the notion that men and women 
are meaningful categories of difference which legitimise women being regarded as 
inferior to men and therefore treated less well (...) [and] there has been a lot of pressure 
to binarise and to keep people in fixed categories of men and women with restrictive 
norms about what counts within each category. This has an adverse impact on pretty 
much everybody concerned: on those who struggle to fit those norms, and on those who 
manage it but then experience immense pressure to remain within the tight confines it 
imposes. So I think it is important politically to expand what is possible within each of 
these categories, to question the importance that is placed upon these particular 
categories, and to point out the arbitrariness of the categories themselves. (2015).  
By the nature of the problematisation, gender mainstreaming guidelines and practices 
demonstrate their complicity with binary gender ideals in such a way that they not only adopt 
it, but by reusing it and forming their problem representation based on it, actively (and 
contradictorily) contribute to its interpellation and reproduction. 
The reproduction of this representation creates some problematic lived effects. For 
example, despite the obvious positive lived effects of the Dilaasa project, including increased 
availability and accessibility for victims of domestic violence, improved treatment and 
aftercare, and recognition of the lack of awareness regarding gender issues and differences 
within Indian healthcare systems, the Dilaasa project’s similar representation to guidelines on 
gender mainstreaming in their representation of gender existing within a binary is problematic, 
and could arguably contribute to negative effects of such a problem representation both with 
regards to gender inequality and members of transgender, and gender-nonconforming 
individuals, existing within queer communities. The Dilaasa project’s problem representation 
is rigid in its casting men as the perpetrators and women as the victims of violence as it fails to 
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recognise the possibility of any deviation from this framework. This is evident in the copies of 
intake forms for patients entering the Dilaasa centre, only female pronouns and language are 
used to refer to the victim receiving treatment (“Her relationship to the abuser,” “Belting the 
woman,” etc.) and only male pronouns and language are used to refer to the abuser (“Does he 
or his family threaten to kill you?”, “Is he violent towards your children?” etc.) (2005, pp. II - 
IV). Not only does this reinforce the binary understanding of woman/victim vs man/abuser, it 
is inherently heteronormative and cisnormative to inherently assume that all of the patients 
referred to their clinics will be women who have been abused by men. This representation 
limits potential discourse surrounding gender-based violence as it does not allow for the 
consideration or possibility of domestic violence within non-heterosexual relationships, or of 
violence committed against somebody who does not identify as a woman. This rigidly confines 
promising discussions surrounding gender-based violence and therefore the potential of 
resultant actions that can be strategised and carried out, and rigidly reinforces gendered 
stereotypes regarding male aggression and masculinity and female passivity. However, despite 
its problematic nature, this representation is a fairly normative narrative that can be seen at 
state levels within Indian legislature. For example, the legal definition of rape provided in 
Section 375 of the Penal Code describes all of the acts that a man could commit against a 
woman that would count as rape - with no coverage of many acts a no that could be committed 
by a non-male perpetrator or against a non-female victim of rape. The language used in the 
penal code specifically refers to male and female body parts in its description, stating, “A man 
is said to commit “rape” if he (...) penetrates his penis, (...) inserts, to any extent, an object or 
part of the body, (...) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or her to do so 
with any other person, (...) Against her will (...) [or] Without her consent,” (Ministry of Law 
and Justice, 2013, p. 5). To represent sexual violence in such a way – as necessarily relating to 
body parts and gender identity assumed from those parts – reinforces this strict binary into 
which individuals are categorised into one or the other meaning that if one does not fit into 
either category - such as a male victim of rape – Indian law provides no actual protection. It is 
not clear why this is the case, whether acts of sexual violence carried out against certain 
individuals are not simply recognised as rape by the law as it is viewed exclusively to be a 
crime that can only afflict women, or that the law deems variant cases to be less important and 
so less necessary to ensure legal protection is provided. However, one such argument for the 
existing framework of legally defined rape is discussed by the Centre for Civil Society in an 
essay calling for male rape to be recognised by Indian law, stating, “These groups 
[campaigning for the definition to remain as it is] argued that rape was an explicitly patriarchal 
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crime, directly stemming from the grotesque abuse of male power and privilege (…) [They] 
have raised two distinct issues: the idea of rape being divorced from female-specific 
consequences for the survivor and the exploitation of gender-neutral language by men. // In 
looking at the former, it is obvious enough that, apart from feelings of humiliation and shame 
experienced by both genders, there are certain burdens placed on female survivors, such as the 
higher value Indian society places on maintaining female virginity”, (Ibid.). This argument 
considers rape not as a need for sexual gratification, but as an exertion of power, and pertains 
that the current framework of male rapists and female victims is formed in order to necessarily 
identify existing patriarchal power structures. Yet, as the Centre for Civil Society points out, 
“there are burdens placed on male survivors, such as being perceived as effeminate or perhaps 
even homosexual, unfortunately taboo topics for men, that would not be equally felt by female 
survivors,” (No Date). By bringing attention to specific issues relating to male victims of sexual 
violence, an interesting point is highlighted – that patriarchal displays of power do not 
necessarily need to be carried out specifically against somebody of a particular biologically 
assigned sex or gender in order for them to be considered an act of gender-based violence. 
Female and non-female victims of rape alike are forced to live with the physical, emotional, 
and social after effects and consequences of experiencing such an attack, and so the framework 
that excludes all non-female victims from language and discourse surrounding rape, as 
represented within the penal code and gender mainstreaming practices such as Dilaasa’s, 
ignores a large amount of victims of rape and sexual violence. For example, statistics 
demonstrate that around eighteen percent of adult Indian men report having been coerced or 
forced into having sex, with sixteen percent of these reporting that their attacker was female, 
and two percent that their attacker was male (Ibid.). 
Necessarily determining the gender of perpetrators and victims of both sexual and 
domestic violence, as the problem representation within gender mainstreaming responses to 
gender based violence does, is problematic in a number of ways. Whilst its justification could 
be attempted via claims that it reflects the demographic of statistics detailing the huge amount 
of violence committed by men, against women, the reliance and use of the gender binary as 
reflected in gender mainstreaming guidelines and practices such as Dilaasa’s work, and in 
Indian legal definitions of sexual violence is extremely exclusive. With such a binary 
presupposing their representation of the problem of gender inequality and gender-based 
violence, any individual existing outside of the two proposed gender categories, such as many 
gender non-conforming, transgender, or genderfluid people, are excluded as if it is simply not 
possible for them to be victims of such crimes, or as if they simply are not as deserving of the 
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same protection, treatment, and consideration as female victims of violence. The exclusion of 
certain members of society in such a way not only casts that group as an othered identity 
existing outside of what is considered to be normal, but actively contributes to normative ideas 
regarding gender roles, gendered traits, and gender identity. 
In a country as richly diverse as India, the representation of gender as existing within a 
binary is both contradictory and puzzling. India is home to a multitude of different communities 
and individuals who identify as a number of different gender identities, such as the long-
existing Hijra community. Acceptance of gender fluidity is so much a part of Indian culture 
that 2014 saw the Supreme Court publicly acknowledging that it was a human right for each 
individual to be able to determine their own gender and so legally recognised an established 
“third gender” category which enabled transgender citizens to legally change their gender 
identity (BBC News, 2014). The legal recognition of the third gender alone, even without any 
social aspects considered, makes the reliance on the binary construct of gender all the more 
questionable as to do so excludes a legally accepted and protected group of society members 
from gender mainstreaming discourse. Binary gender ideas not only erase the identity of such 
individuals and contribute to pre-existing issues such as social exclusion, and transgender and 
non-binary invisibility; it also excludes those who identify outside of the gender binary from 
consideration in gender-related issues, such as gender mainstreaming attempts to lessen 
gender-based and domestic violence. 
This understanding suggests that gender mainstreaming guidelines and practices 
assume that the main issue behind gender inequality is gaps between those with certain sex 
characteristics (characteristics that define their gender identity) - the hierarchical arrangement 
that affords higher status to males/men within society and oppresses and subordinates 
females/women. Whilst the truthfulness of this representation cannot be highly contested with 
regards to the heightened status of males over females and men over women, representing 
gender inequality in this way, as an issue solely concerning certain people with certain bodies, 
frames the problem at hand as inextricably sex-linked. This provides a somewhat limited 
representation of existing gender hierarchies. 
Gender inequality is enforced not just by the privileging of male over female, man over 
woman, but also masculinity over femininity. Raewyn Connell developed a theory of 
“hegemonic masculinity”, depicting an integral set of gender hierarchies, with hegemonic 
masculinity being in the dominant position as the, “pattern of masculinity which is most 
honoured, which occupies the position of centrality in a structure of gender relations, and 
whose privileged position helps to stabilize the gender order as a whole, especially the social 
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subordination of women. [It] is contrasted not only with femininity, but also with subordinated 
or marginalized masculinities that exist in the same society,” (Connell, 2014, p. 8). Connell 
argues that masculinities and femininities do not relate directly to definitive types of people, 
and are instead “gender projects” adopted by individuals (Schippers, 2007, p. 86). These 
theories lend to an interesting thought - that gender inequality is not necessarily the sole 
oppression of females but femininity more generally, and all traits, acts, and mannerisms 
associated with the feminine. Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity adds credence to this 
view that it is not certain sex characteristics in and of itself that are privileged within society, 
as she demonstrates that there are a number of hierarchies even just within masculinity that 
deems certain forms as dominant over others. Although being assigned male or being viewed 
as a man is assumed to be a privileged position, being male, or being perceived as being male, 
isn’t enough in and of itself to avoid falling victim to the hierarchy. The nature of hegemonic 
masculinity being the ultimate, true embodiment of what it is to be masculine dictates that the 
majority of men will never be able to attain it, and must therefore exist in subservient positions 
to those who fulfil the quota. (2014, p. 8). 
Due to the disproportionate amount of violence committed by men against women, it 
is difficult to find fault with gender mainstreaming implementation strategies that focus heavily 
on female victims of violence. It could be considered that, whilst violence against individuals 
who do not identify as women (such as male or transgender victims of violence) may be an 
important issue, it is nevertheless a separate issue. However, there have been a number of 
studies that resulted in conclusions that demonstrated that certain kinds of violence against 
non-female individuals has the same root causes and contributing factors as violence against 
women. Despite how the gender binary frames aggressors and victims of gender-based 
violence, certain theories suggests that violence against women, and violence against other 
individuals, are not as disjointed as they may seem. For example, a 2009 USAID study 
focussing on transgender and men who have sex with men (MSM) communities conducted by 
Myra Betron and Evelyn Gonzalez-Figueroa discusses the need to further discourse 
surrounding gender-based violence to include non-female victims of violence, stating, 
for MSM and TG [transgenders], gender identity is an important underlying cause of 
such [gender-based] violence. This paper examines the immensity of GBV [gender-based 
violence] against MSM and TG without detracting from the problem of violence against 
women and girls. Indeed, female victims do suffer greater physical damage than male 
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victims (WHO, 2005) and their subordinate status (both economic and social) 
“contributes to an environment that accepts, excuses, and even expects violence against 
women” (Heise et al., 1999). Still (...) violence experienced by MSM and TG has 
similarities to violence against women in that it usually occurs because MSM and TG do 
not ascribe to traditional gender roles or because they are viewed as effeminate, and so, 
subordinate to others. // In the case of intimate partner violence among MSM and TG, 
including those who engage in sex work, violence appears to be a way to subordinate 
them to inferior feminine roles, similar to women who experience violence within 
heterosexual relationships (p. 2). 
This statement offers a contribution to more open discourse on gender-based violence 
by widening the parameters of those who could potentially be considered a victim. Betron and 
Gonzalez-Figueroa reconsider the assumption that gender-based violence is committed only 
against women, and by doing so challenge underlying rigidly categorised binary perceptions. 
By proposing that violence may occur because victims are effeminate rather than because they 
are exclusively female, or in order to subject victims into subordinate feminine roles, Betron 
and Gonzalez-Figueroa suggest that femininity and its traits, mannerisms, and physical 
presentations, is oppressed in the same vein as femaleness and so those who exhibit feminine 
traits and ways of presenting themselves – including women – are relegated to the bottom of 
the gender hierarchy. This oppression of femininity, or “femmephobia”, reinforces the gender 
hierarchies Connell discusses that systematically privilege and honour masculinities in such a 
way that necessarily places femininity at the bottom of the order. As Natalie Reed states, 
“Femmephobia (...) is a particular subset of sexism that suggests that femininity and things 
regarded as feminine are inherently inferior, bad, weak, stupid, non-preferable, valueless, [and] 
disempowering,” (2011). These feminine traits can be embodied and presented by potentially 
any body, a concept discussed by Connell that proposes that femininities and masculinities can 
become projects in the lives of any person in such a way that shapes their individual ways of 
performing, presenting, acting, and identifying. As Connell determines that femininity is not 
exclusive to females, then it follows that neither should its oppression be. The widespread and 
systematic subordination of femininity affects individuals of many and all gender identities as 
well as women, and intersects with a multiplicity of issues. Julia Serano develops this idea with 
regards to one such crossover in her theory of “trans-misogyny”, a concept that describes how 
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the intersection of transphobia and misogyny forms a type of oppression aimed specifically at 
transgender women, and transgender and gender non-conforming folk who live and present 
themselves towards the feminine end of the spectrum (Ibid., 2007, p. 14). As Serano states, “In 
a male-centered gender hierarchy, where it is assumed that men are better than women and that 
masculinity is superior to femininity, there is no greater perceived threat than the existence of 
trans women, who despite being born male and inheriting male privilege “choose” to be female 
instead. By embracing our own femaleness and femininity, we, in a sense, cast a shadow of 
doubt over the supposed supremacy of maleness and masculinity,” (Ibid., p. 15). By 
determining that the root of the oppression of trans-feminine individuals is founded in an 
opposition to their deviation from accepted socially assigned gender norms, specifically 
towards the feminine and therefore inferior end of the gender hierarchy, Serano highlights how 
the roots causes of gender inequality pertaining to violence against women often exist within 
the same vein as the causes for multiple forms of oppression. As she states,  
While often different in practice, cissexism, transphobia, and homophobia are all rooted 
in oppositional sexism, which is the belief that female and male are rigid, mutually 
exclusive categories, each possessing a unique and nonoverlapping set of attributes, 
aptitudes, abilities, and desires. Oppositional sexists attempt to punish or dismiss those 
of us who fall outside of gender or sexual norms because our existence threatens the idea 
that women and men are “opposite” sexes. (...) Our natural inclinations to be attracted to 
the same sex, to identify as the other sex, and/or to express ourselves in ways typically 
associated with the other sex blur the boundaries required to maintain the male-centred 
gender hierarchy that exists in our culture today, (2007, p. 13).  
If, as Connell states, hegemonic masculinity is “most honoured” and assumes the 
central position in a structure of gender relations (2014, p. 8), then trans-feminine individuals 
who supposedly consciously choose not only to not attempt to live up to this ideal, but to 
embody the opposite, challenge the very structure of gendered society. 
This male-centred hierarchy is so rigidly enforced that, in accordance with cisgender 
women, trans-feminine individuals often accept, reinforce, and even welcome their own 
subordinate societal status. For example, in a report researching violence against sex workers, 
transgender women were quoted telling of their complicity with the violence their partners 
committed against them because it reaffirmed their status and role in their relationships. One 
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woman stated, “I don’t mind if my girya (man) beats me up. It only shows how manly and 
powerful he is,” whilst another stated, “When my parik (“husband”) beats me, I feel as helpless 
as a woman. Since I want to be a woman, it actually makes me feel good,” (Ordek et al., 2010). 
These interviews offer an insight into the lasting effect controlling and coercive power of 
gender-based violence has on gender roles and representations. In these cases the violence 
exerted reinforced the victims’ feminised and therefore inferior role in such a way that they felt 
their feminine gender identity became more legitimate and validated. The necessary equation 
these women made between being a woman and being a victim of violence demonstrates how 
rigidly gender hierarchies are enforced, to become so ingrained in individuals that enable them 
to become complicit in their own submission.  
The reliance on binary understandings of gender depicts these rigid gender hierarchies, 
necessarily placing individuals at one or other end of the spectrum. By doing so, roles are 
assigned to individuals, in this context with individuals being at increased likelihood of being 
either aggressors or victims of violence. The nature of these hierarchies is that they are self-
fulfilling, with violence being inextricably linked to aspirations of achieving true hegemonic 
masculinity in such a way that forcibly oppresses those presenting themselves at the feminine 
end of the spectrum, and acceptance and complicity with being subject to violence being 
associated with femininity. By relying on the gender binary, gender mainstreaming guides and 
implementation practices not only erase a number of issues such as widespread violence against 
transgender and gender non-conforming individuals in India, but also therefore appear to be 
somewhat counter-productive in their mission. Whilst they actively work to reduce effects of 
gender inequality and to challenge oppositional gender roles, by using and relying on binary 





What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the 
silences? How would ‘responses’ differ if the ‘problem’ were thought about 
or represented differently?  
 
Here it is useful to think about shifts in representation of the ‘problem’ over time 
and/or across cultures. 
 
The reliance on the gender binary correlates with the most common and prevalent kinds of 
gender-based violence - that which is perpetrated by men, against women. It is certainly 
unproblematic that a large part of the focus of gender mainstreaming is to ensure full equality 
and equity for women considering that they are statistically the most likely demographic to 
become victims of gender-based violence, as a United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA) study 
states, “Where gender inequality exists, it is generally women who are excluded or 
disadvantaged in relation to decision-making and access to economic and social resources. 
Therefore a critical aspect of promoting gender equality is the empowerment of women, with 
a focus on identifying and redressing power imbalances and giving women more autonomy to 
manage their own lives.” (2005). As demonstrated by a number of gender mainstreaming 
implementation strategies in practice, such as the Dilaasa project, this specific focus on 
empowering and working towards equality for women has had a number of brilliantly positive 
effects in enacting a number of changes in India, such as encouraging more women to report 
violent attacks and seek aftercare following incidents of violence, assisting victims in finding 
a temporary safe space, and training professionals to recognise signs of abuse so that violence 
can be stopped early on in the abuse cycle (Dilaasa, 2005, p. 35). It is essential to recognise not 
only what is “unproblematic” within this problem representation, but to develop analysis 
further to consider the beneficial and positive aspects of such a representation with regards to 
the goal for achieving gender equality, in order to restructure and reform the problem 
formulation in a more inclusive, intersectional manner that would aim to broaden its equality 
goals. 
 However, it is possible to both commend gender mainstreaming strategies and projects 
in practice for the progressive steps they have taken and continue to put into motion, whilst 
still recognising a number of silences left by the interpretation of the problem represented 
within gender mainstreaming policies. As discussed in the previous chapters, binary 
understandings of gender, whilst understandable, are unproductively exclusive in their 
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ignorance of many types of gender-based violence. Domestic violence within homosexual 
relationships, sexual violence committed against men, non-binary and gender nonconforming 
individuals, and violence based on temporarily assumed gender roles are just some of the issues 
that are overlooked, and as a result the potential for productive discourse around the issues in 
relation to the wider problem of gender inequality in general is erased. 
Responses may differ if the underlying assumptions regarding the problem were 
thought about differently in such a way that allowed the range of inequalities addressed and 
fought against to broaden. If the problem were to be represented without such a binary 
presupposing its interpretation then the opportunity may rise for gender hierarchies to be 
addressed in a more determined and absolute way, and more various forms of gender-based 
violence could be drawn into focus. The gaps and silences left by the current representation of 
the problem could be made visible by a conscious, determined effort to make gender 
mainstreaming policies more wholly intersectional. Meg-John Barker discusses this idea in 
their essay on non-binary feminism, specifically calling for more intersectional approaches in 
order to deconstruct the binary and better work towards gender inequality, stating, 
“Intersectional feminism is about challenging the notion that there are any categories into 
which people can be divided which justify one group being treated less well than another. [It] 
is also about recognising that we need to challenge all axes of oppression rather than just one 
of them because they cannot be disentangled.” For Barker, intersectional approaches are 
essential not only because they work towards ending multiple forms of oppression, but a 
feminist approach that does not have an intersectional focus is counter-productive to its goal. 
As they state, “If we remove one whilst leaving the others intact then (...) that is not feminism, 
it is bullshit!” (2015). They argue that tackling both the issue of one group’s dominance over, 
and subordination of, the other, and “the bit about dividing people into two categories in the 
first place,” are as crucial in the project of feminism as the other, stating that, “it is part of the 
same battle to point out and try to change oppression, and to point out and try to change the 
assumption that gender is binary.” Barker sees the two as innately connected and inseparable, 
in such a way that the challenging of one cannot prevail without simultaneously tackling the 
other - and so by representing the problem of underlying binary assumptions in this way, taking 
on both is fundamentally necessary in order to deconstruct a damaging dichotomy that both 
enables and furthers the oppression of one group over another, and renders invisible a whole 
host of wider issues connected with gender inequality (Ibid.). 
These underlying binary assumptions have not always been so rigidly enforced, 
however. It is difficult to think of this representation without considering the different 
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perceptions of this representation over time. An especially significant influence on 
representations of gender has been the colonisation of India by the British Empire in the 19th 
Century. Indian scholar Ruth Vanita carried out extensive research into queer narratives in the 
history of Indian literature and culture and, together in her research with Saleem Kidwai, found 
that, pre-colonialism, same sex romance and acts were most often represented with either a 
neutral or a positive attitude, but that this attitude drastically changed after India’s colonisation 
(2009, p. 48). In 1871, Britain introduced the The Criminal Tribes Act, which perceived certain 
tribes and communities to be “criminals by birth, with criminality being passed on from 
generation to generation”, thats implementation coincided well with Indian ideas of 
hierarchical social orders (PUCL-K, 2003, p. 44). Once a tribe was identified as criminal, all 
members were required to register with local authorities and were placed under surveillance 
that restricted their movement and placed them under constant suspicion of criminal activity 
with local law enforcement, and in 1897, an amendment was made to the Criminal Tribes Act 
under the subheading, “An Act for the Registration of Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs”. Sexual 
immorality had long been equated with tribes, as, “for the keepers of social morality, [their] 
lack of visible social institutions implied complete disorder in their community life. Their lack 
of written codes of conduct, and absence of articulated norms of morality implied absolute 
licentiousness,” (Meena Radhakrishna, quoted in PUCL-K, 2003, p. 44). This attitude was 
directed especially harshly towards “eunuchs”, defined as, “all members of the male sex who 
admit themselves, or on medical inspection clearly appear, to be impotent,” (p. 44), with a 
British officer reported stating his disgust toward eunuch communities, “they are absolutely 
the scum, the flotsam and jetsam of Indian life, of no more regard than the beasts of the field,” 
(Ibid., p. 45). Attitudes such as this led to eunuchs being recognised as criminal, and therefore 
their lives were placed under surveillance. The worth of their very existence was diminished 
by dehumanising restrictions that invalidated eunuch’s place in society by removing some of 
their basic rights, such as making gifts or adopting sons, due to the perception that they were 
not capable. What is especially significant about acts such as this is is the influence it has had 
on societal perceptions of those who deviate from gendered identity norms. As a study 
conducted by the Peoples’ Union for Civil Liberties, Karnata (PUCL-K) collecting reports of 
violence experienced by hijra and kothi sex workers in Bangalore states, “the contemporary 
perception of hijras as thieves as well as the brutal violence which is inflicted against them can 
be traced back to this colonial legislation which stands repealed today in theory but continues 
to exist as part of the living culture of Indian law”, (p. 46).  
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Colonial rule also saw the introduction of Section 377 under the Section, “Offences 
Affecting the Human Body” that criminalised “unnatural offences” (Ibid.). It is a little 
ambiguous what these offences exactly and specifically are, but the section in essence 
criminalises “basically any form of sex which does not result in procreation” (Ibid., p. 47). This 
does not explicitly affect members of transgender communities, in that they are not directly 
mentioned or referenced, but as the PUCL-K study states, “due to the nature of the homophobic 
discourse, these acts are specifically located in the bodies of queer people. To be a homosexual 
or a hijra is to draw the presumption that the hijra or the homosexual is engaging in ‘carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature’. This particular interpretation of Sec 377 means that all 
queer people, particularly the kothi and hijra sex worker population are particularly vulnerable 
to harassment under this provision.” (Ibid.).  
Post-colonialism, Indian society was torn between colonial influence and long-existing 
cultural traditions and ideals. Some right-wing groups believed homosexuality and gender 
transgressions were the influence of Western rule, and opposed them vehemently in order to 
maintain “traditional” Indian values (Vanita, 2009). After Indian independence, many Indian 
nationalists fought against what they believed to be Britain’s corrupt influence, by attempting 
to reinforce pure moral values, and Indian society saw a number of changes. Abstinence from 
alcohol, vegetarianism, and the strong encouragement of procreational marriages were seen as 
tactics to decolonise India, which had a strong influence on ideas regarding gender attitudes 
and roles. As Thomson et al. state in their essay on social stigmatisation of transgender 
communities in South India,  
Viewed against this background, the normative sexuality of contemporary India is 
procreative and heterosexual within the confines of marriage and still largely arranged 
along the lines of caste and religion, with other forms of sexual behaviour outwardly 
considered taboo and even stigmatising. Although opportunities for women have 
expanded in recent decades, masculinity continues to be defined through marriage, 
fatherhood and reproduction and non-procreative sex, whether heterosexual or same-sex, 
continues to be viewed by many Indian conservative politicians and right wing Hindu 
nationalist organisations as threatening the ‘moral fabric’ that constitutes the Indian 
Nation-State. (Thompson et al., 2013, p. 1240) 
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India’s post-colonial reaction reinforced heteronormative, cisnormative, and cissexist 
ideals and assumptions that prioritised masculinity and lead to increased intolerance towards 
gender and sexual deviances that transgress the socially imposed binary that influences 
representations of gender inequality by gender mainstreaming policies. If these binary ideals 
and assumptions were to be broken down, disproved, and reconsidered with a more 
intersectional lens, gender mainstreaming responses may differ and become broader in their 





How/where are dominant problem representations produced, 
disseminated and defended? How could they be 
contested/disrupted?  
 
Explore contradictions and discursive resources for reconceptualisation (re-
problematization). 
 
The fight to end gender inequality in India has certainly received increasing amounts of media 
attention in recent years, largely triggered by Jyoti Singh’s public rape and murder. Worldwide 
activists and journalists, and members of local communities, decision makers, and victims and 
families have spoken out in efforts to bring India’s high rates of gender-based violence into 
mainstream conversation. Attempts have been made by influential figures and organisations, 
such as the United Nations and state governing bodies, to ensure that gender perspectives are 
considered at all levels of decision making and development processes, and nongovernmental 
organisations such as the Dilaasa and Parivartan projects have enacted efforts to ensure issues 
related to gender-based violence are brought into mainstream consideration in multiple sectors, 
such as healthcare and law enforcement. Such organisations have spread their mission by 
working extensively at community levels to both implement concrete policies to provide 
assistance, care, and greater protection to victims of gender-based violence, and to challenge 
widespread acceptance of gender-based violence and provide sensitivity training and greater 
and more specific education to influential community members in positions of care, such as 
law enforcement officers and healthcare professionals. 
 The work of these organisations, as well as the prolific attention in the media on gender-
based violence in India, ensures the perpetuation and reinforcement of gender mainstreaming’s 
ultimate problem representation by highlighting gender inequality on multiple communal and 
structural levels throughout Indian society. Drawing attention to gender-based violence in such 
a way aims to ensure that the dissemination of the problem representation occurs at all levels 
– from top-down measures such as policy implementation, to bottom-up approaches from 
grassroots initiatives and nongovernmental organisations who engage with local communities 
to educate individuals and challenge commonly held prejudices. 
Gender mainstreaming’s problem representation is also produced and disseminated 
throughout the societal enforcement of gender norms, despite the aim of implementing gender 
mainstreaming challenging gender roles in its attempts to break apart hierarchical gender 
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perspectives that devalue women. As Manasi Singh states, “gender mainstreaming goes beyond 
women’s issues and deals with gender perspective as a whole and strives to achieve gender 
equality by restructuring the gender roles and relations in society,” (No Date, p. 11), although 
the nature of challenging in such a dichotomous way ensures gender mainstreaming practices 
are complicit in the reinforcement of binary gender norms. A norm is defined by Posner and 
Rasmusen as, “a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation or 
enforcement (...) Often a norm will result from (and crystallize) the gradual emergence of a 
consensus. Norms are enforced by internalized values, by refusals to interact with the offender, 
by disapproval of his actions, and sometimes by private violence,” (1999, pp. 369-370). 
Although it would be unfair and inaccurate to suggest that gender mainstreaming strategies and 
implementation projects in practice were necessarily active in the creation of such social 
norms, the frequent use of, and reliance upon, these norms suggests complicity in the cycle of 
reproducing and fortifying them - and so gender mainstreaming plays its part in the 
“consensus” in accepting the norm. In their exclusive referral to two existing genders, gender 
mainstreaming policies demonstrate an internalised understanding of gender identity in which 
the subjects in question must fit into one of two categories or else risk being excluded from 
projects altogether. The essentialist equation between gender identity and biologically assigned 
sex at birth as represented by gender mainstreaming policies only further exemplifies this 
complicity with the binary norm. It bolsters the idea that gender identity is given and not self-
determined, and thus those who deviate from one of the two gender options, or appear to 
transition from one category to the other, violate socially accepted gender norms by existing 
outside of the essentially proposed categories. 
According to Posner and Rasmusen, norms are, “an attractive method of social control,” 
that are enforced by sanctions carried out against those who transgress (1999, p. 370). 
Exclusively belonging to one of the two proposed gender categories is a commonly and rigidly 
enforced norm throughout Indian society, and those who breach the proposed gender divisions 
risk facing a strict backlash via the exertion of social sanctions. As the PUCL-K study states, 
“What became apparent in the course of our study is that discrimination against hijras and 
kothis is embedded in both state and civil society. The violence that this community faces is 
not only due to the state but also has deep societal roots,” (2003, p. 76). Posner and Rasmusen 
identify six types types of sanction that threaten those who violate social norms, three of which 
are especially enforced in this context; automatic sanctions, guilt, and shame (1999, p.371). 
Automatic sanctions are self-fulfillingly enforced by not complying with the actions of others 
- such as somebody choosing to drive on the other side of the road than the accepted side of 
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the country they are in, and therefore crashing their car. Guilt is enforced through an 
individual’s upbringing and understanding of what is right and wrong. If they violate some 
norm or other, that they have been raised to understand is wrong, it is likely that the individual 
will feel guilty for their action. Shame is enforced by ensuring that the violator feels that their 
status has been lessened in either their own eyes or the eyes of others who would be likely to 
condemn their transgression (Ibid.). All three types of sanction are routinely employed against 
those who violate binary gender norms in India, and gender mainstreaming strategies have their 
part to play in this. 
For example, transgender individuals in India often face automatic sanctions due to 
their deviation from societally imposed gender norms excluding them from a number of 
protections, rights, and services. For example, with forty percent of the community testing 
positive, India has the highest rate of transgender women infected with HIV in the world (Baral 
et al. 2013). However, due to the exclusion of transgender issues from mainstream discourse, 
and a general lack of prioritisation of transgender rights, healthcare services that offer treatment 
for, and work to prevent, HIV amongst transgender women is inadequate. A UNDP report 
looking into the effects of social exclusion of Hijras and transgender women in India 
(Chakrapani, 2010) called for specific, holistic healthcare to be provided for individuals from 
Hijra and transgender communities, including separate health surveillance centres and 
improved psychological care as well as physical (Ibid., p. 5). Transgender women and Hijras 
in India often find that their living outside of socially accepted essentialist norms excludes their 
specific needs from mainstream healthcare considerations and training of healthcare 
professionals. As the UNDP report states, “Often, healthcare providers rarely had the 
opportunity to understand the sexual diversities and they do not have adequate knowledge 
about the health issues of sexual minorities. Thus, TG people face unique barriers when 
accessing public or private health services. Barriers in accessing HIV testing, antiretroviral 
treatment and sexual health services have been well documented.” (Ibid., p.8). By violating the 
norm of conforming to binary gender roles, transgender and Hijra individuals in India face 
automatic sanctions such as increased risk of receiving no or inadequate healthcare. 
Many transgender individuals in India also face being shamed by the communities they 
exist within. The PUCL-K study reported a wide variety of stories from kothis and hijras 
detailing their experiences of discrimination, humiliation, and shaming from member of their 
local communities, law enforcement officials, and even members of their own families. For 
example, Swati, a hijra, tells of one experience she had when she invited some friends over to 
her house for a party. Eight police officers turned up at the party, claiming that they’d been 
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called under suspicion that they were carrying out sex work at the house. When Swati and her 
friends explained they were just having a party the officers subsided, until they discovered that 
Swati and her friends were hijras. They began deliberately shaming the party by asking 
humiliating questions, such as “Are you all impotent, are you all ‘chakkas’ (derogatory term 
for hijra)?”, forced them to show their breasts, and groped them (2003, p. 33). Another 
testimony from “Smita” details similar attempts from police officials to humiliate her. Whilst 
standing outside a commercial complex one evening, Smita and her husband Tejasvi were 
violently arrested and she was sexually assaulted by the officers on their way to being taken to 
the local police station. Once there, her and her husband were locked in a room where between 
fifteen and twenty officers stripped and then stood around her and abused her naked body, 
forcing her to carry out humiliating sexual acts in front of them. They physically abused her by 
hitting her across her body and shaving her hair, and, “verbally abused her by repeatedly 
referring to her as ‘khoja, gandu, bastard, son of a bitch’ and used the foulest language as they 
continued to beat her, making vile comments like: “Did you come here to get fucked anally?”, 
“Whose cocks did you come here to suck?”, “People get AIDS from you, one day you will die 
of AIDS, chakka, I will fuck your mother”, (Ibid., pp. 28 - 29). Brutal as they are, violent acts 
of degradation and humiliation such as these are not isolated incidents as acts of violence are 
reportedly incessant occurrences in the lives of transgender individuals in India (Ibid., p. 30). 
The degrading nature of these acts of violence is deliberately constructed in order to punish 
and aim to “correct” the victims’ transgression from the norm, as the PUCL-K study states, 
“The source of such violence is clearly the prejudice about hijras’ ‘deviant’ sexuality and 
gender identity which transgresses society’s binary division of gender into male and female – 
indicating that what appears as random and arbitrary violence is in fact part of a methodical 
policing for the preservation of mainstream, therefore heterosexist, society”, (Ibid.). The 
USAID study researching rates of violence amongst MSM and transgender communities in 
India backs up this claim, stating that the widespread internalisation of homophobia and 
heterosexism lie at the roots of incitations of such acts of violence (2009, p. 2). Because 
transgender, hijra, and MSM individuals deviate from these socially imposed heterosexist 
binary gender norms, they are stigmatised by state and society alike. The act of stigmatisation 
is an effective method in shaming an individual, as it highlights, “an undesirable or discrediting 
attribute that an individual possesses, thus reducing that individual’s status in the eyes of 
society”, (Goffman, 1963, quoted in Betron & Gonzalez-Figueroa, 2009, p. 2). 
The casting of guilt as a social sanction is often inextricably linked with feelings of 
shame and the individual’s guilt of bringing shame to one’s family or loved ones for having a 
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family member who transgresses social norms so transgressively and thus many transgender 
individuals report attempting to hide their transgender identity in order to spare their families 
the shame of having a transgender relative. As Abir Day, a transgender person from Kolkata, 
states, she refrained from legally seeking to change her gender to transgender as her family, 
“would not be able to handle” such a public transition (Murray, 2016). Feelings of guilt often 
originate in the fear that the individual’s violation of the societally imposed norm will bring 
the family the collective shame that has already been imposed upon the individual subject. Jan 
Cornish, a transgender individual, told of their intense feelings of guilt related to their gender 
dysphoria, stating, “In my experience I am not the victim but the villain. It is seen that I have 
made a lifestyle decision that will embarrass my nearest and dearest and that I am being very 
selfish and not considering them in any way. They feel that they are the victims and therefore 
I am guilty of being uncaring and self centred”, (2013). Feelings of socially sanctioned in India 
can often be deeply linked with cultural expectations that an individual should uphold their 
family’s reputation. Familial reputation and honour are extremely important in Indian culture, 
as each individual member of a family is seen in the light of their family reputation, with the 
family’s reputation considered when individuals make most of their important life decisions 
(Mandelbaum, 1970, p. 37). These norms are especially enforced with regard to the 
transgression from a masculine to feminine presentation and identification that ties closely in 
with Julia Serano’s theory of trans-misogyny. As she discusses, “there is no greater perceived 
threat than the existence of trans women, who despite being born male and inheriting male 
privilege “choose” to be female instead. By embracing our own femaleness and femininity, we, 
in a sense, cast a shadow of doubt over the supposed supremacy of maleness and masculinity,” 
(2007, p. 15). 
As Butler states, gender norms are “exercised coercively,” (Hartley, 2011) by the rigid 
enforcement of social sanctions, to the extent that they are adopted and thus individuals become 
complicit in their doing and reproduction of them. From a young age, children learn how to act 
in accordance with their assigned sex category (male or female), and adopt seemingly essential 
gendered natures. West and Zimmerman’s 1987 work on “doing gender” offers great insight 
into this adoption, and the production and reinforcement of gender norms. They argue that 
doing gender is utterly unavoidable to the extent that it leaves individuals “hostage to its 
production” (1987, p. 126), and that doing so means, “creating differences between girls and 
boys and women and men, differences that are not natural, essential, or biological. Once the 
differences have been constructed, they are used to reinforce the “essentialness” of gender,” 
(Ibid., p. 137). West and Zimmerman state that if we produce gender appropriately, “we 
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simultaneously sustain, reproduce, and render legitimate (...) institutional arrangements (...). 
Doing gender furnishes the interactional scaffolding of social structure, along with a built-in 
mechanism of social control,” (Ibid., pp. 146 - 147). What this essentially means is that 
individuals appropriate gender ideals that leads to them adopting gendered identities that they 
endeavour to sustain. 
Due to individuals’ innate attachment to gender norms as part of their own identity, 
they are somewhat self-sustaining. The act of “doing gender” as set out by West and 
Zimmerman becomes so naturalised that performance of gender is often unconsciously done, 
and so individuals reproduce and perpetuate the same binary gender norms they are subjected 
to. Norm reinforcement, by way of “doing” gender and coercively imposed by social sanctions 
“produce, disseminate, and defend” underlying binary assumptions of gender mainstreaming 
strategies, and the reliance and use of the binary as seen within gender mainstreaming 
guidelines and practices suggest not simply its complicity with binary gender norms, but its 
active involvement in their reproduction. 
Because much of the reproduction of the underlying binaries constructing the problem 
represented by gender mainstreaming strategies is so innately ingrained in every aspect of 
society, from patriarchal lenses on policy making to individual acts of doing one’s own gender, 
such binaries are difficult in their nature to deconstruct. As Posner and Rasmusen state, 
“Eliminating a norm requires promulgation, too, and also the destruction of the expectations 
and tastes that support the sanctions for its violation—a process of taste changing that may be 
as costly as their creation in the first place. Changing a norm, which requires elements of both 
destruction and creation, can be the most difficult trick of all.” (1999, p. 377). They argue that 
norm deconstruction or change should be enacted slowly, in order to allow society to gradually 
adapt. This is arguably the case even when the change occurs in favour of a superior norm, 
because norm change or deconstruction inevitably takes time to settle in smoothly. If a norm 
were forcibly employed suddenly, the risk of a, “rent in the fabric of social control” increases 
as too quick an introduction may make the new norm dysfunctional, as the “normative system” 
has not yet had enough time to adapt and transition (Ibid., p. 378). Introducing new norms 
tentatively and steadily is also not necessarily enough to ensure their eventual acceptance and 
adoption of a new norm. As Posner and Rasmusen point out, norms enforced by the social 
sanctions of guilt and shame, such as rigidly enforced binary gender norms, are particularly 
difficult to dismantle due to strongly emotive principles or morals of society members heavily 
influenced by social conditioning (Ibid., p. 379). As they point out, nongovernmental 
organisations may be more effective that small individual efforts or large-scale impositional 
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governmental motions to change norms, but that it remains unclear whether societies will have 
more or less norm creation and stability if they allow norm-creating organisations free-rein. 
If guilt and shame as social sanctions keeping binary gender ideals in place is so 
effective then before the norm can be deconstructed or changed work must be done to weaken 
those sanctions. As Cavanagh states, “Humane gender recognitions depend on the availability 
of trans-positive imagery, discourses, and ‘ways of seeing’ that are not reducible to binary 
gender assignments at birth and national identification papers authorizing two unalterable and 
mutually exclusive gender positions (male and female)”, (2010, p. 58). It is essential to raise 
trans-positive imagery and discourses in order to lessen ignorance and stigma surrounding both 
trans-identities and any individual transgression from binary and essentialist gender norms. 
Increasing visibility of identities that divert from expected norms helps humanise stigmatised 
existences, as the UNDP state in their research into transgender health and human rights, “It is 
impossible to be included within a community and society if one’s very existence is denied. 
Yet such exclusion is routinely experienced by trans people when there are only two, binary 
sex options (male or female)”, (2013, p. 29). What this entails is that it is essential to include 
non-binary and transgender perspectives in mainstream discourse in order to increase the 
“availability” of positive perceptions that leads to “humane gender recognitions” (Cavanagh, 
2010, p. 58). 
It therefore seems that, in order to break down damaging essentialist binary gender 
norms, gender mainstreaming polices need to be adapted in such a way that dismantles the 
underlying binary assumptions. If gender mainstreaming policies were to represent 
understandings of gender that focused more on structural gender hierarchies not essentially 
linked to sex category rather than dichotomous representations of violent males and female 
victims, then gender-based violence in India could be addressed more broadly and effectively, 





The research I have carried out throughout the course of this paper has led to my understanding 
that gender mainstreaming policies in theory are an overall effective, efficient, and necessary 
tool in dealing with high rates of gender-based violence in India. By aiming to bring previously 
not-talked about issues into mainstream discourse and challenging traditionally enforced 
gender roles, gender mainstreaming plays a crucial part in the fight towards gender equality. 
However, unless the binary presuppositions underlying gender mainstreaming’s problem 
representation are deconstructed, I advocate that the achievement of gender mainstreaming’s 
“ultimate goal” to achieve gender equality is not possible. I have argued that these 
presuppositions help to maintain damaging gender hierarchies that privilege masculinity and 
subordinate femininity in a way that contributes to detrimental socially-imposed gender norms.  
Gender mainstreaming policies aim to challenge the existence of gender inequality at 
all levels of society. This representation is formed upon the assumptions that gender inequality 
is inherently a bad thing that should be challenged, and that gender-based violence is a rigidly 
categorised thing that consists of female victims subjected to violence by male aggressors. 
These assumptions produce a number of effects – on the one hand, gender 
mainstreaming is essential in the fight to end structural inequality and reduce acts of gender-
based violence as they challenge commonly accepted social hierarchies and injustices and force 
routinely ignored gender perspectives into mainstream considerations in such a way that 
necessarily entails the gendered effects of any level of decision making is taken into account.  
On the other hand however, the binary recognition of gender-based violence as 
portrayed by gender mainstreaming policies and pragmatic accounts of implementation are 
exclusive in their representation, which ignores complex structural gender hierarchies that 
actively create and distribute widespread femmephobia. This leads both to furthered exclusion 
of marginalised communities that do not fit into such a categorisation, and limits the scope of 
gender equality goals. By relying on dichotomous accounts of gender identity, gender 
mainstreaming policies inadvertently and paradoxically reinforce essentialist norms and 
stereotypes that help keep gender hierarchies in place, and thus are complicit in the 
interpellation of reproducing these norms. By excluding certain identities from their 
representation, gender mainstreaming policies also demonstrate their complicity with the social 
imposition of coercive gender norms, therefore contradicting their own goal to further the cause 
for gender equality and not to further perpetuate any form of inequality. 
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It is my hope for the future that gender mainstreaming policies are reconsidered, and 
attempts are made to deconstruct the binary assumptions that underlie their formation, to 
include broader and more flexible understandings of gender identity. Though well-intentioned 
and socially progressive in accordance with high-rates of gender-based violence in India, 
gender mainstreaming policies will continue to fall short of their goals until policy-makers first 
accept that gender transcends the prevailing narrow and dichotomous conceptualisation that 
gender identity purely consists of male and female. If gender mainstreaming policies aim to 
become more wholly intersectional, and work together with multiple progressive movements, 
then the potential increases that more inclusive and widespread methods of addressing gender 
inequality and tackling gender-based violence will develop. Only then can gender equality 
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